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Summary 
Transaction cost economics faces serious problems concerning the way it deals, or fails to deal, with 
bounded rationality, the efficiency of outcomes, trust, innovation, learning and the nature of 
knowledge. The competence view yields an alternative perspective on the purpose and boundaries of 
the firm. However, the competence view cannot ignore issues of governance, and in spite of serious 
criticism, transaction cost economics yields useful concepts to deal with it. This article aims to 
contribute to the development of theory and empirical research that connects governance and 
competence perspectives.  
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the field of inter-firm relations an important question is how theory of governance, based on 
transaction cost economics (TCE), and the ‘resource’ or ‘competence’ perspective of the firm can be 
reconciled (Williamson 1999). I propose that for a synthesis TCE needs to be transformed more 
radically than Williamson makes out. TCE faces fundamental criticism concerning the way it deals, or 
fails to deal, with bounded rationality, the efficiency of outcomes, trust, innovation, learning and the 
nature of knowledge.  
Many heterodox economists and business scholars are led by such criticism to reject TCE 
altogether. I maintain that in spite of the criticism TCE retains valuable insights that should be 
preserved in a new synthesis. From a competence perspective also, one cannot ignore issues of 
governance. In particular, the hold-up problem that arises from dependence as a result of relation-
specific investments remains an issue. It does not disappear in a dynamic perspective of learning or 
the development of new competencies, but re-appears in a different light.  
New questions and instruments of governance emerge. From the competence perspective we 
need to incorporate learning and innovation, and next to hold-up risk we need to incorporate risk of 
spillover. Also, we may learn about the extent and limits of a partner’s opportunism, and in learning 
the extent of opportunism will change. Trust must be added as a factor of governance.  
  This article proceeds as follows. It consists of two parts. The first yields a theoretical analysis 
of five crucial themes. One is the issue of bounded rationality, its implications for the extent and 
nature of foresight and for the achievement of efficient outcomes. Related to this is an issue of time: 
does TCE really incorporate the implications of the passage of time for the development of 
transactions and processes of learning? The third issue is the unit of analysis: should it be transactions 
or relations? The fourth issue is the relation between opportunism and trust. The fifth issue is our 
understanding of knowledge and learning. The final, sixth issue concerns the implications for the 
purpose and the boundaries of the firm.  
The second part of the article considers implications, predictions and empirical evidence. It 
analyses the causal structure of TCE, and the empirical evidence for it. For part of TCE the empirical 
corroboration is extensive and convincing, but for another part it is not. There is convincing evidence 
that specific investments yield a hold-up problem, which requires governance to control it. Also, TCE 
yields useful instruments for such governance. That part of TCE is included in the synthesis I propose. 
However, the evidence for the predictions from TCE concerning organisational integration, in firms, 
or in bilateral or trilateral governance, in hybrids ‘between market and hierarchy’, is mixed and 
inconclusive. I will argue that this is because there are considerations that TCE neglects, and which 
can be incorporated from a competence perspective. The causal relations in a combined framework of 
governance and competence retain the empirically successful parts of TCE and add empirical 




Bounded rationality, foresight and efficiency.  
Williamson (1999) claimed that he fully accepts bounded rationality: there is fundamental uncertainty 
concerning future contingencies. However, he claims, there is foresight: one can take such uncertainty 
into account, infer the hazards that follow from it and conduct governance accordingly (in a 
‘discriminating alignment’) and ‘efficiently’, i.e. in an optimal fashion (to yield an ‘economizing 
result’). We are not myopic, Williamson claims: we are not so stupid as not to take uncertainties into 
account when we design governance. And indeed, we can to some extent take risks and uncertainty 
into account. Firms can spread risks by participating in different markets, in the same way that 
investors can spread risks in a portfolio of investments. Beyond that, to deal with real or radical 
uncertainty we can construct scenarios of possible futures, prepare contingency plans for them, and 
identify the robustness of strategies across different scenario’s. 
Scholars in the competence perspective do not assume myopia, as Williamson accuses them 
of doing. However, of course the question arises what the implications of bounded rationality are for 
the correct identification of relevant hazards. Bounded rationality implies that we might be mistaken 
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learning’, and indicates that we may be mistaken about hazards and may learn about them as events 
unfold (1999: 1104). And apart from hazards there are new options. In spite of great imagination and 
ingenuity, the scenario’s we invented may not include what actually arises. Also, preferences may 
shift. That is part of learning. And if new insights in hazards arise, new scenario’s, or new options or 
goals, are we then able to shift from the governance structure engaged upon to an adapted, optimal 
form? That would always be possible only if there is no path-dependence or lock-in in governance, 
and that is a strong claim to make. 
  This is related to the issue of ‘efficient’, optimal outcomes. Williamson’s argument is that 
‘dysfunctional consequences and other long run propensities will not be mindlessly repeated or 
ignored’ (Williamson 1999: 1105). But this begs a number of questions. It implies that dis-
functionality and long run propensities are stable, so that experience in the past is indicative of the 
future. There is no guarantee that this is the case. Indeed, in innovation and learning it is not, almost 
by definition. And if one we could correctly adapt our foresight, how can one be sure that the firm 
survives to implement the lesson in time? TCE seems to fall back on the notion of selection: 
inefficient forms of organization will be selected out by ‘the market’. That is the usual assumption 
behind the economist’s assumption of efficient outcomes, going back to Alchian (1950). But if that is 
Williamson’s argument, he is deviating from the perspective of the firm strategist, who is talking 
about the survival of the firm (Chiles and McMakin 1996). Furthermore, the selection argument was 
already shown to be weak by Winter (1964). In selection it is not the best possible but the best 
available in the population that survives. In the presence of economy of scale inefficient large firms 
may push out efficient small firms, and thus inefficiency may survive. Furthermore, efficient selection 
cannot be taken for granted in view of possible monopolies, entry barriers and transaction costs. 
 
Time 
Williamson claims that his theory is inter-temporal, incorporating the passage of time, and indeed he 
claims that this is central to TCE (1999: 1101). And indeed, up to a point it does incorporate inter-
temporality. It makes a distinction between ex ante considerations, before commitment of transaction 
specific investments, en ex post considerations, after their commitment. This yields the ‘fundamental 
transformation’ from multiple to ‘small numbers’ of options. The theory also is inter-temporal in the 
sense of taking uncertainty concerning future contingencies into account, as discussed in the previous 
section. However, TCE does not go far enough and, again, is not consistent in this. Williamson (1999: 
1101) does claim that ‘governance structures are predominantly instruments for adaptation, it being 
the case that adaptation ... is the central problem of economic organization; organization has an inter-
temporal life of its own ...’. He admits, however, that this ‘is not to say that it (TCE) has worked all of 
these out in a satisfactory way. I entirely agree that transaction cost economics stands to benefit from 
more fully dynamic constructions. But whereas saying dynamics is easy, doing dynamics is hard’. 
This is in line with Williamson’s other admission, quoted above, that learning is not well developed in 
TCE. I agree with all of this, but it is quite an admission, after saying that inter-temporality is central 
to TCE. What is said here is that what is central is not well developed. I propose that nowadays 
innovation and learning are crucial, and should be in the core of theory. That is in fact what 
competence theory strives for. 
Let me develop one particular issue related to the passage of time and learning that is 
particularly relevant in the debate. TCE does not assume that everyone is equally opportunistic, but 
that prior to a transaction one can have no reliable information about one’s partner’s degree of 
opportunism, and therefore one has to assume opportunism, as a basis for governance, to avoid the 
hazard involved. Williamson (1985: 59) argued as follows: ‘inasmuch as a great deal of the relevant 
information about trustworthiness or its absence that is generated during the course of bilateral trading 
is essentially private information - in that it cannot be fully communicated to and shared with others 
(Williamson 1975: 31-37) - knowledge about behavioural uncertainties is very uneven.’ This may be 
so. But it yields insufficient argument to ignore trust. Why should it be easy to incorporate trust? Even 
if it is difficult, disregarding it may be worse.  
There are further problems with Williamson’s position. As the transaction relation unfolds in 
time, couldn’t one accumulate more or less reliable information about trustworthiness? The 
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observed behaviour (Deutsch 1973). Did the partner act not only according to the letter but also to the 
spirit of the agreement? Did he give timely warnings about unforeseen changes or problems? Was he 
open about relevant contingencies, and truthful about his dealings with others who might constitute a 
threat to oneself? Did he defect to more attractive alternatives at the earliest opportunity? Or to use 
Hirschman’s (1970) notions of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’: how much voice rather than exit did he exhibit? 
Furthermore, the literature on trust indicates the possibility that in interaction partners may get to 
understand each other better, which enables a better judgement of trustworthiness, in ‘knowledge 
based trust’. In ongoing interaction they may develop shared cognitive frames, by which they may 
identify with each other's goals, in ‘identification based trust’, with understanding or even sympathy 
for weaknesses and mistakes (MacAllister 1995, Lewicki and Bunker 1996). This does not entail that 
they always agree. There may be sharp disagreements, but those are combined with a willingness to 
express and discuss them more or less openly, in ‘voice’, offering mutual benefit of the doubt. As a 
result, conflicts may deepen the relationship rather than breaking it. 
  When Williamson argues for the assumption of opportunism, he does not seem to be aware of 
the price one pays for that. It leads one to possibly costly contracting. Due to economies of scale in 
transaction costs it is especially costly for or with regard to small firms (Nooteboom 1993). What is 
worse, such a contract might seriously constrain the freedom and open-endedness of action that is 
crucial especially when the collaboration is aimed at innovation and the development of new 
competencies. Even worse than that, the expression of distrust, based on the assumption of 
opportunism, is likely to destroy the basis for building up trust as the relation unfolds. There is much 
evidence in the trust literature that distrust breeds distrust and may even elicit opportunism. Then the 
assumption of opportunism may become self-fulfilling, with considerable costs of contracting and loss 
of perspective for a fruitful relationship. 
  Williamson’s argument against taking a dynamic process approach is that it is easier said than 
done. That is true. The main attraction of economic analysis of equilibrium outcomes is that it is 
analytically tractable and relatively simple. For a dynamic process approach one may have to resort to 
complex simulation models, and they have problems of their own, such as, notably, problems of 
complexity and problems of validation. However, problems of complexity and tractability have been 
considerably reduced by the development of computers and software. A whole new branch of 
economics has developed, called ‘Agent Based Computational Economics’ (ACE). This methodology 
is currently being used to model the evolution of collaborative or transactional relations, including the 
building and breakdown of trust, in what is called ‘Agent Based Computational Transaction Cost 
Economics’ (ACTCE, Klos and Nooteboom 2001). Agents are modelled as adaptive, learning to 
revise their assessment of trustworthiness, the weight they attach to it relative to profitability, and 
their own opportunism. One of the things that this type of model illustrates is that complexity and 
path-dependence in relations often preclude the achievement of optimal outcomes: those are achieved 
only occasionally.  
 
Trust and opportunism 
Williamson has been ambiguous about trust. In his 1975 book Williamson (1975) employed the notion 
of ‘atmosphere’, which comes close, it appears, to trust. In his 1985 book (Williamson 1985) trust is 
not dealt with. Later, Williamson (1993) faced the issue squarely and asked a very good question: 
Does trust go beyond calculative self-interest? If it does not, it adds nothing to existing economic 
analysis. If it does, it yields blind trust and that is inadvisable in market relations, outside relations of 
family or friendship. In markets it will not survive. Thus, Williamson argued, whichever way you look 
at it, trust can be discarded. In his 1999 article Williamson suggests that scholars in the competence 
perspective ‘presume the absence of opportunism ...(and thereby)  .. enter the world of ‘utopian 
fantasies’. Of course, those scholars are not that naive. They do not reject opportunism but they reject 
Williamson’s rejection of trust. In other words, they allow for trust next to opportunism.  
There is a vast literature on trust that cannot fully be discussed here (for a survey, see 
Nooteboom 2002). There is a widespread view that trust includes elements of control or ‘deterrence’, 
including both legal coercion and control by incentives and dependence, as well as elements that go 
beyond control, as a basis for ‘goodwill’ or ‘benevolence’ (Shapiro et. al. 1992, Das and Teng 1998, 
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‘Trust and control in organizational relations’, 22/2, 2001).
 As noted by Maguire et. al. (2001: 286): if 
we do not include the latter, we conflate trust and power. Most authors do not wish to suggest that 
altruism or goodwill operates independently from self-interest or control. The relation between the 
two is a subject for extensive debate. As noted by Bachmann (in Lane & Bachmann 2000: 303), trust 
is a hybrid phenomenon, including both calculation and goodwill. TCE, however, only includes 
control, and denies the viability of trust that goes beyond calculative self-interest. Many authors feel 
that such control is foreign to the notion of trust, and that ‘genuine’ trust is based on other, more 
social and personal foundations of trustworthiness, such as loyalty, empathy, friendship, reciprocity, a 
sense of moral duty or obligation, and routinized behaviour. Therefore, trust has been defined as the 
expectation that a partner will not engage in opportunistic behaviour, even in the face of 
countervailing short-term opportunities and incentives (Bradach and Eccles 1984, Chiles and 
McMackin 1996, Nooteboom 1996). To argue the case for trust in more detail, let us return to 
Williamson’s clear and pointed argument that if trust goes beyond calculative self-interest, it 
necessarily becomes blind and unconditional, and in markets that is not viable. The counter-argument 
is that trust is both necessary and viable. Markets could not work without non-calculative trust. Trust 
can work without becoming unconditional, which would indeed be unwise, as Williamson suggests. 
At some level trust is inevitable. Complete lack of trust beyond calculative self-interest would 
prevent one from entering any relation and thereby one would deprive oneself from evidence that may 
contradict mistrust. Absence of trust would yield an infinite regress of seeking safeguards for the 
hazards involved in ambiguity concerning the terms of safeguards. Such ambiguity is inevitable: even 
legal language does not yield complete lack of ambiguity. No language can. It has been recognized by 
others that even if all relevant contingencies were known, there will still be incompleteness of 
contracts because of ‘bounded writing and communication skills’ (Hart 1990: 699) and the fact that 
‘language would not be rich and precise enough to describe all the eventualities’ (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992: 129). On the other hand, too much trust will be corrected by experience that invalidates 
it.  
  There are several foundations for trust beyond calculative self-interest. One lies in norms and 
values concerning decent behaviour, or ethics, which constrain opportunism. They are not calculative 
but socially inculcated, as part of tacit knowledge or predilections. There is an argument from 
evolutionary psychology that there is a tendency towards reciprocity ‘in our genes’. Reciprocity entails a 
give and take that goes beyond economic ‘quid pro quo. Return favours are not guaranteed, and their size 
and timing are not specified. That was conducive to survival in the ancient hunter-gatherer societies in 
which humanity evolved. In gathering edible plants, roots, nuts, etc., and even more in hunting, there is 
a large variance of individual success. This, together with problems of durable storage, entails an 
evolutionary advantage of the willingness to surrender part of one’s yield to others in need, in the 
expectation to receive from them when they are successful (Barkow et. al.1992: 212). This would 
solve the problem, often noted in the literature, how in a sequential game of give and take the first move 
of giving, and thereby making a risky pre-commitment, is made (Simmel 1978, Luhmann 1979, quoted in 
Lane & Bachmann 2000: 3). The evolutionary argument suggests that we do this instinctively. It also 
suggests that we have developed a ‘cheater detection mechanism’ (Barkow et. al. 1992). 
Another basis for non-calculative trust lies in routinization (Nooteboom 1999). Herbert Simon 
a long time ago showed that routines have survival value because they reserve our scarce capacity of 
‘focal awareness’ in rational, calculative thought for conditions that are new and demand priority. 
When things go well for a while in a relationship, one tends to take at least some of it for granted. One 
may no longer think of opportunities for opportunism open to a partner, or to oneself. And it seems 
rather odd to call routines calculative. How can something that is subconscious be calculative? I 
proposed (Nooteboom 2002) that on the basis of experience in relations, trustworthiness is assumed 
until evidence to the contrary emerges. In other words, trust is a ‘default’. The possibility of 
opportunism is relegated to ‘subsidiary awareness’ (Polanyi 1962). Of course, routines are not 
unconditional, unless they have sunk so deeply into our nature that they become instincts. Generally, 
when something out of the ordinary occurs, our awareness shifts from subsidiary to ‘focal’ and we 
look critically at what is going on. As Simon (1983) pointed out, we need emotions of danger and 
excitement to catapult us into focal awareness. In relations of voice, we must next control emotions to 
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accurately: it is not unconditional. Does this triggering back into focal awareness, then, make routines 
calculative? Again: can subsidiary awareness be called calculative? And can emotional triggering be 
called calculative?  
  While trust is not always calculative, it is constrained by possibilities of opportunism (Pettit 
1995). One way to model trustworthiness is in terms of a limited resistance to temptation towards 
opportunism. This may be modelled as a threshold for defection: one does not opportunistically defect 
until the advantage one can gain with it exceeds the threshold. This threshold may depend on the 
wider cultural environment, the narrower cultural environment of a firm one works for, personal 
upbringing, and genetic endowment. It is likely to adapt as a function of experience. Trust may then 
be modelled as based on a perception of such a (limited) constraint of opportunism on the part of a 
partner. That perception may entail tacit rather than explicit knowledge. It will be routinized, based on 
experience, and part of subsidiary awareness. Within that limit one can economize on contracting. 
When temptations are perceived that may be too large, trust makes way for calculation. So even 
though it is and should be constrained, since indeed unconditional trust is unwise, within the margin 
of perceived or assumed trustworthiness it can save on contracting. 
 
Dynamic capabilities 
Williamson (1999: 1095-96) objects to the vagueness (‘expansiveness’ and ‘elasticity’) of the notion 
of competence or resource. And one can sympathise with this. Some people say a competence is a 
special kind of (intangible) resource, others say that it is the ability to efficiently exploit a resource, 
and yet others say that it is the ability to develop new resources (in ‘exploration’). There is an obvious 
relation between competence or resource and the notion of a routine from evolutionary economics 
(Nelson and Winter 1982). There, a hierarchy of routines is recognized: for production, for investment 
and for changing routines of production. However, the notion of a routine is equally vague. 
Nevertheless, I note that the notion of ‘competence’ is not more vague than the notion of transaction 
costs was at the outset of TCE. In TCE, much effort has gone into making its notions more precise, 
and to operationalise and measure them. That latitude must be allowed also for the emergent 
competence perspective.  
While transaction cost economics focuses on static efficiency – by trading off production 
costs, transaction costs and costs of organisation, given a certain state of knowledge, technology and 
preferences– we require a perspective of dynamic efficiency or innovation, incorporating shifts of 
knowledge, technology and preferences. It is now a priority for firms to develop ‘dynamic 
capabilities’. For this, they need to maintain flexibility of configurations of competencies, for the sake 
of innovation in the form of Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’. This yields the claim that firms 
should concentrate on the activities at which they are best (‘core competencies’) and outsource the 
other activities as much as strategically possible. For example, in order to reduce development times 
of new products and to reduce risks of maladjustment to customer needs, the supplier should be 
brought in as a partner in developing and launching a new product. However, note the qualification of 
strategic possibilities. One may need to integrate activities in order to control risks of dependence and 
spillover, or to preserve options for future core competencies. Here, one can combine perspectives of 
competence and TCE. 
This perspective of ‘dynamic capabilities’ is more fundamental for the boundaries of the firm 
than transaction cost considerations. Considerations of capabilities are strategically more crucial than 
transaction costs, especially since there are instruments to control hold-up risk in outside relations. 
Dynamic capabilities entail that in addition to the usual considerations of efficiency, flexibility, and 
speed, learning is an important goal of collaboration. For this we need a theory of knowledge and 
learning.  
 
Knowledge and learning    
As economics more generally, TCE has no explicit theory of knowledge and learning. The implicit, 
espoused view is that of naive realism: we can observe reality, this yields information, which may cost 
time and money to collect, but when available yields the same, objective knowledge to different 
people. Language and communication are seen according to the label and conduit metaphors. A term 
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shipped across communication channels. 
  I propose a different theory, which is espoused in the organizational literature (Weick 1979, 
1995). People observe, interpret and evaluate the world according to categories or mental frameworks 
of perception, interpretation and evaluation perceptions and interpretations (Johnson-Laird 1983). 
Those frameworks constitute ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). They have been 
developed in interaction with the physical and social world (Nooteboom 1992). This implies possible 
path-dependence of cognition. It also precludes claims of objectivity, because knowledge is 
constructed. However, it is likely to be in some way connected to reality, or representative of it, since 
it is by interaction with the world that we develop our ways of seeing it. This yields what Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) called ‘embodied realism’. However, we can’t make independent claims of realism, 
since we cannot ‘climb down from our minds to see how knowledge is attached to the world’. 
  What we have inherited from evolution is an ability to construct our views and interpretations 
in interaction with the world. Since this is a shared heritage, there is bound to be some similarity 
between people in the way they do this, and perhaps also in its outcomes. This saves us from the arid 
extremes of post-modern relativism. However, since this ‘knowledge’ is developed in interaction with 
one’s specific, idiosyncratic string of experiences in specific contexts, it is also bound to vary 
between people, to the extent that they have developed in different environments and have not 
communicated with each other. The resulting variety of cognition is not a problem but an opportunity. 
It yields a source of innovation; of Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’. Since we cannot climb down 
from our minds to inspect the realism of our views, the variety of views that people have, from 
different experiences, yields the only opportunity we have for correcting our errors of knowledge.       
  As a result of the cognitive variety discussed before, there is always greater or lesser 
‘cognitive distance’ between people. Learning from interaction requires sufficient distance for novelty 
but also sufficient proximity for understanding (Nooteboom 1992, 1999). If effectiveness of learning 
is the mathematical product of comprehensibility and novelty, comprehensibility decreases linearly 
and novelty increases linearly with such distance, this yields an inverse-U shaped function, with an 
optimal cognitive distance. 
  In organisations, a focus is needed of shared perceptions, interpretations, and values, in order 
to achieve common goals. This yields the idea of an organisation as a ‘sensemaking system’ (Weick, 
1979, 1995, Weick and Roberts 1993), ‘system of shared meaning’ (Smircich, 1983), ‘focusing 
device’ (Nooteboom, 1992, 1999), or ‘interpretation system’ (Choo, 1998). This is more fundamental 
for organisations than the need to reduce transaction costs. However, such organisational focus 
creates a risk of myopia, which needs to be redressed by employing complementary cognition from 
outside partners, at a ‘cognitive distance’ that is sufficiently large to yield novel insight and 
sufficiently small to ensure that it is still comprehensible (Nooteboom, 1992, 2000). This yields the 
argument for outside relations for the sake of ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ (Nooteboom 
1992). Reducing cognitive distance entails convergence of cognition. In intensive, long term 
interaction cognitive distance will reduce, especially if it is also exclusive, i.e. if partners do not have 
different interactions with others as well. This yields an argument not to integrate but maintain 
distance in inter-firm collaboration, where outside partners remain immersed in outside relations with 
others (Nooteboom 1999).  
 
Unit of analysis 
The focus of attention should be on the transaction relation rather than the transaction (as TCE 
claims). Even in TCE, the core concepts of opportunism, specific investment and hold-up relate not to 
a transaction but to a transaction partner or the relation one has with him. Relational risk inheres in a 
relation with a specific partner. This point connects with the earlier discussion on the time issue. If we 
are to see ‘governance structures as instruments of adaptation’ and organization as ‘having an inter-
temporal life of its own’ (Williamson 1999: 1101), then the unit of analysis has to be the evolving 
relation. 
Competencies are not off-the-shelf products but are embedded in the heads and hands of 
people, in teams, organisational structure and procedures, and organisational culture. They have a 
strong tacit dimension, especially in innovation. Their development is path-dependent: they build 
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Ongoing or intermittent interaction is needed to enable the exchange of tacit knowledge. Some 
scholars conclude that this requires full organisational integration, but I deny that. However, the 
exchange and joint production of knowledge between firms with different perspectives and 
competencies does require mutual absorptive capacity and a shared language for communication, to 
cross ‘cognitive distance’. This takes time to develop, and can constitute a dedicated investment, so 
that relations have to last a sufficiently long time to make the investment worthwhile. Here, in this 
new perspective on specific investments, in mutual understanding, there is a connection between the 
competence perspective and TCE.  
A second argument derives from the previous discussion of trust. If we really appreciate the 
time dimension, then we have to analyse how trustworthiness or opportunism evolve in time and how 
their extent may be observed.  
 
Purpose of the firm 
The simple theory of knowledge indicated above gives the basis for a competence view of the purpose 
and boundaries of the firm that is more fundamental than the theory offered by TCE. I am not saying 
that thereby transaction cost considerations are irrelevant to the boundaries of the firm. They are just 
less fundamental than cognitive considerations. 
  As suggested above, the basic purpose of the firm is to serve as a ‘focusing device’, to 
achieve a common purpose among people with different knowledge and competencies, based on 
different experience. This requires a certain amount of alignment of cognitive categories for 
perception, interpretation and evaluation (which includes value judgements and intentionality). In 
other words: reduction of cognitive distance. The proper alignment of cognition, in this broad sense, 
including motivation and goals, is the primary task of leadership. It is related to the Schumpeterian 
notion of charisma as a crucial trait of entrepreneurs. Note that this alignment of perception and 
motivation reduces problems of opportunism: it reduces both the perception and the utilization of 
‘opportunities for opportunism’. However, such alignment entails a risk of myopia: relevant 
opportunities and threats for the firm are not perceived. To compensate for this, the firm needs 
complementary cognition from outside partners, to utilize external economy of cognitive scope. This 
yields a new perspective for evaluating the purpose, choice and governance of inter-firm relations.  
  Cognitive alignment in the firm, or in networks of firms, should not go so far as to reduce 
cognitive distance to zero, with everybody having the same, shared experiences and no outside 
contacts, or identical contacts. Homogeneity of cognition tends to have priority when efficient 
production is strategically crucial, with division of labour and the utilization of economy of scale, 
requiring strong connections between nodes in the scripts. Then the need for cognitive proximity 
prevails; optimal distance will be relatively small. Variety and novelty of cognition have priority 
when innovation is strategically crucial. Then the need for cognitive distance prevails, and optimal 
distance will be relatively large. A problem arises when both needs arise at the same time. 
  This connects with the discussion of ‘exploitation and exploration’, in the organization 
literature (Holland 1975, March 1991). Exploitation of existing resources is necessary to survive in 
the short term, development of new resources and competencies (‘exploration’) is required to survive 
in the long term. Their combination is paradoxical. Exploitation generally requires close co-
ordination, and entails a narrowing process, in the elimination of redundancy, variety, ambiguity, and 
hence entails small cognitive distance. Exploration generally requires a loosening of linkages, opening 
up to variety and ambiguity, with large cognitive distance. So, if they need to be combined, a solution 
is to combine a sharp focus, with small cognitive distance, within the firm, for the sake of 
exploitation, with ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ in outside contacts at a larger cognitive 
distance, as a basis for exploration (Nooteboom 2000a).       
  Williamson noted the spillover argument from Teece (1986) for the decision to integrate 
activities: to prevent inter-firm contracting from yielding leakage of proprietary knowledge. However, 
Williamson (1999: 1097) insists that although it seems obvious that integration can prevent spillover 
better than disintegration, that intuition ‘.. needs to be worked through. What, precisely, are the 
mechanisms through which this differential protection is realized?’  
 
 8Boundaries of the firm 
From a competence perspective there are arguments for integration, next to TCE arguments of hold-up 
control. As in the control of hold-up risk, spillover also can be better controlled within the firm, where 
one can demand insight in streams of knowledge, and create guarantees against spillover better than 
one could demand from an independent outside partner. Knowledge spills over less easily when it is 
tacit, rather than documented. Even then, it can still spill over by poaching of the staff in which the 
knowledge is embodied. However, spillover can be further obstructed when competencies are 
embodied not in single people but in teams, organizational structure or culture. Another argument, 
from the competence perspective, for integration is that by outsourcing one may surrender the 
capability to assess the value of the offering of suppliers (Beije, 1998). Also, one may drop a 
capability that later turns out to be crucial in order to utilise or replace elements of core competence. 
Teece (1986) proposed that the appropriation of returns on core competencies may require access to 
complementary assets. Even if those are not part of core competence, they may have to be integrated 
in the firm. One may therefore have to see such complementary assets as attached to core competence. 
From a competence perspective the arguments for disintegration, in outside relations, are: 
cognitive scope and flexibility of Schumpeterian novel combinations. These come in addition to TCE 
considerations of economies of scale in specialised outside producers (if the corresponding productive 
assets are not too specific), and the ‘powerful incentives’ of an independent producer responsible for 
his own survival. 
Concerning loss of crucial capabilities, mentioned before, there are ways to deal with these 
problems also in alliances. One is to make use of a benchmarking service, so that one can compare a 
supplier’s offering with best practice. A second is to maintain sufficient R&D in the outsourced 
activity to maintain ‘absorptive capacity’, i.e. the ability to judge developments in the field. This may 
also help to retain the option of re-entry later, to retain options for future core competencies, perhaps 
as a second mover, but still fast enough to be a serious player. This is reflected in empirical evidence 
that firms retain an R&D capability in activities that were outsourced (Granstrand, Pavel & Pavitt, 
1997). Such R&D can perhaps be done in collaboration with others, in an R&D consortium. One may 
also try to retain the required openings in distribution channels, perhaps by means of alliances. In 
other words, outside collaboration may be used to retain options for the utilisation or modification of 
core competencies. Here, the flexibility of outside collaboration returns: one may use it to maintain 
more flexibility also in options for future core competence.  
Overall, the argument for an alliance is that it gives more focus of core competence, more 
flexibility of configuration, and more variety of competence, as discussed before. Another great 
advantage of an alliance is that it entails fewer problems of clashes between different cultures, 
structures and procedures, in management, decision making, remuneration, labour conditions, 
information and communication, which often turn out to be the biggest obstacles for a successful MA. 
Of course such clashes can also occur in alliances, but less integration still entails fewer problems of 
integration.   
The take-over of a young, dynamic, innovative firm may serve to rejuvenate an old firm 
(Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). In a growing new firm, the entrepreneur often has to turn himself 
around to the role of an administrator, or hire one, to delegate work and institute formal structures and 
procedures for the coordination of more specialised activities in larger scale production. He may not 
be able or willing to do that, and it may be to the benefit of the firm when it is taken over by a firm 
with a better managerial capability. However, it may be more likely that the entrepreneurial dynamic 
of the small firm gets stifled in the bureaucracy of the acquirer, in which case it should stay separate.     
There is an argument of scale for both integration and disintegration. In production, many 
economies of scale have been reduced, e.g. in computing. However, there is still economy of scale in, 
for instance, distribution channels, communication networks, network externalities, and brand name. 
For integration, the argument of scale is that one pools volume in activities in which one specialises. 
For outsourcing, the argument is that for activities that one does not specialise in, an outside, 
specialised producer can collect more volume, producing for multiple users. That may also offer more 
opportunities for professional development and career to staff that are specialised in that activity.  
From the perspective of brand image there are also arguments for both integration and 
separation. In an alliance there may be too great a risk that the image or quality of a brand allotted to 
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maintain an independent, outside brand, to preserve its local identity. 
  An equity joint venture is an intermediate. It yields advantages of control without full 
integration of all activities of the parents. Thereby, it allows for more focus on core competencies and 
limits integration problems. It can separate off and protect a new, entrepreneurial activity from 
established bureaucracy. By separating activities off from the parents one can also better control 
spillover problems for existing partners. If an existing partner of one of the parents is suspicious that 
his knowledge may spill over to parts of the other parent that compete with him, in a joint venture that 
can be shielded off. The new venture may also offer new opportunities for financing.  
 
Governance 
Having extended and clarified the criticism of TCE and the substance of the competence perspective, 
I now turn around to argue the need for including useful elements from TCE to incorporate 
governance in the competence perspective. 
  As argued, we cannot deny or ignore risks of opportunism, and resulting problems of 
relational risk, even if we accept that trust is real and relevant. It was argued above how important it 
is, from a perspective of learning by interaction, to invest in mutual understanding between diverse 
perspectives, to utilize complementary cognition at a distance. Such investment is often relation-
specific, and thus creates the problem of hold-up identified by TCE. Such specific investment is not 
necessarily symmetrical. A larger absorptive capacity, resulting from specialized staff, and a greater 
fund of experience in crossing cognitive distance can yield understanding with lower specific 
investment. This is an issue, for example, in collaboration in R&D between large and small firms. The 
large firm tends to have greater absorptive capacity than the small one, and thus the latter is more 
vulnerable to spillover. 
  However, TCE has to be expanded here also. In governance, we have to systematically 
incorporate the spillover problem. Spillover risk and the notion of hostages are connected. For 
example, information provided to the partner may be used as a hostage, in the sense used in TCE. In 
fact, that can be used deliberately as an instrument in a governance package. For example, when 
specific investments are one-sided, and there are drawbacks in making the hold-up risk more even by 
sharing ownership, compensation may take place by the less dependent party surrendering sensitive 
information as a hostage. That may be the preferred solution if such information transfer is useful also 
for other reasons, such as helping the other side in improving his competence. Take the case of small 
and large firm collaboration. Lesser absorptive capacity of the smaller firm not only increases his 
relative hold-up risk (due to higher specific investment in understanding) but also his spillover risk. 
The larger partner surrendering sensitive knowledge may strike a balance. That may yield three 
benefits at once: balance of hold-up risk (by the hostage mechanism), balance of the spillover risk, 
and improvement of the small firm’s competence. 
  A small firm can also protect its knowledge from spillover by keeping it more tacit. For a 
large firm this is more difficult, because under division of labour, with many specialists interacting 
with each other, knowledge has to be more documented in procedures, for the purpose of co-
ordination. In a small firm, with direct supervision of the whole of a firm process such need is less. 
  If spillover cannot be protected by internalisation within the firm, because of the need for 
collaboration with outsiders, to profit from their complementary cognition, one can try to maintain 
exclusiveness, and demand that partners do not interact with one’s competitors, in the area of activity 
under consideration. However, such exclusiveness of relations constrains the sources of learning 
one’s partner has access to. In other words, it constrains the variety of knowledge that is a source of 
innovation. This is exacerbated by the fact that durable relations with exclusive, more or less isolated 
partners will in due course reduce cognitive distance and further reduce variety. An interesting option 
arises under ‘radical’ speed of change, defined as change of products or technology that is faster than 
the time it takes for knowledge to spill over. Note that what is relevant here is not just the time needed 
for the ‘information’ to ‘reach’ a competitor. In fact ‘spillover’ is a misleading term, because it 
suggests the naïve view of knowledge as a commodity shipped across a communication channel. A 
crucial question is whether a competitor is able to absorb, imitate and implement the knowledge, and 
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become a moving target.  
  When we combine the governance and competence perspectives, an important issue for both 
science and policy is the following. How do we make the trade-off between on the one hand durability 
and exclusiveness and on the other hand flexibility of network relations. Sufficient durability and 
exclusiveness are needed to recoup the specific investment needed for mutual understanding and 
collaboration, for the sake of innovative novel combinations. On the other hand, if relations become 
too durable and exclusive they induce rigidity and constrain innovation. This has implications for the 
debate on national innovation systems (Nooteboom 2000b).  
 
IMPLICATIONS AND PREDICTIONS 
 
TCE an empirical success story?  
Williamson (1999) claimed that in contrast with the competence perspective TCE yields sharply 
testable predictions, which are largely corroborated, and thus can be seen as an ‘empirical success 
story’. In the competence perspective, Williamson claimed, there has been lack of sharp and 
falsifiable prediction, operationalisation and empirical testing. Is this claim valid? First of all, there 
are well-known methodological problems concerning corroboration and falsification. I will not 
discuss those here, since they apply to both TCE and the competence perspective. For a recent 
discussion, see Carter (2002). I focus on the empirical evidence, while accepting that for 
methodological reasons their conclusiveness remains, and probably will remain, problematic.  
However, even taking that into account, I make the following counterclaims: 
 
1.  The empirical success of TCE is only partial 
2.  Some of the empirically successful implications from TCE can also be explained from the 
competence perspective 
3.  Of course a newer perspective, such as the competence view, is always less developed 
empirically: operationalisation of concepts has to develop, and data have to be gathered. 
However, progress has been made.  




An important issue, familiar in econometrics, is whether one tests reduced form equations or 
structural equations. Results from the former do not necessarily yield evidence for the latter (Carter 
2002). That is important especially to find out that TCE has been only partially confirmed. When we 
turn to structural equations some of them are corroborated but others are not. In reduced form 
equations these results get mixed up and the evidence becomes inconclusive. The reduced form of 
TCE is as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Figure 1 indicates that in reduced form TCE predicts the three forms of governance, depending on 
uncertainty, specific investments and frequency of transactions. Incorporation in the hierarchy of a 
single firm obtains when uncertainty, specific investments and frequency of transactions are all high. 
When uncertainty and specific investments are significant but not too high, bilateral contracting 
obtains under high and trilateral contracting under low frequency. In bilateral governance instruments 
are: contracts (which, however, cannot be complete), bilateral dependence (due to sharing of 
ownership of specific assets, partial monopoly as a result of specific investments), exchange of 
hostages and reputation (although the latter is not well developed in TCE). Tests on the basis of 
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Neither corroboration nor falsification are convincing. 
However, when we disentangle the reduced form into structural equations, in Figure 2, more 
clarity arises. Tests yield convincing corroboration for causal relation A: specific investments plus 
uncertainty yield a hold-up risk and the need for governance to control it. The effect of specific 
investments on relational risk and some implications for governance have been corroborated 
extensively (Monteverde and Teece 1982, Walker and Weber 1984, Levy 1984, Anderson 1985, 
Heide and John 1988, John and Weitz 1988, Anderson and Weitz 1989, Berger et. al. 1995, 
Nooteboom et.al. 1997).  
 
-------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
The evidence is not convincing for relation B: the form of governance depends on hold-up 
risk and frequency of transactions. I propose that the reason for inconclusive results is that there are 
other causal mechanisms that TCE disregards. Those mechanisms derive from the competence view.  
 
Predictions from an integrated perspective 
My view of the structural equations according to a combination of the competence view and the 




Figure 3 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
Note that causal relation A from Figure 1, which was well confirmed in TCE, is included. A 
new class of specific investments is added: in the building up of mutual understanding, for the 
crossing of cognitive distance, and in the building up of relation-specific, personalised trust. The latter 
is more obviously relation-specific than the former. As argued in Nooteboom (2000a), the ability to 
cross cognitive distance may not be entirely relation-specific. It depends on the extent to which the 
knowledge involved is tacit. Even there however, the ability to understand people who think 
differently may apply to new relation.  
What is further added from the competence view is printed in italics. A central feature is 
uncertainty of learning and innovation. I distinguish between the implications of uncertainty 
concerning the contingencies of contract execution and the implications of uncertainty for learning by 
interacting with others. Greater uncertainty in the sense of complexity and fast change of technology, 
markets and (other) institutions yields the need for outside partners for greater flexibility of 
configurations of competencies and ‘external economy of cognitive scope’, as argued above. 
This yields a prediction counter to TCE. According to TCE greater environmental uncertainty 
will (should) yield more integration under hierarchy, because it makes contracting and monitoring 
more difficult as an instrument to protect against the hazards of opportunism. According to the present 
perspective, greater uncertainty, in the sense of greater complexity and volatility of technology and 
markets, increases the need for outside complementary cognition, and hence will (should) lead to 
more, not less outside relations. This controversy is amenable to empirical test: Is there more or less 
integration when uncertainty in this sense is greater?  
  The prediction can be further sharpened on the basis of the notion of optimal cognitive 
distance, discussed before. There must be distance in order to generate novelty. This pleads against 
integration under a single ‘hierarchy’. However, in spite of this distance there must also be sufficient 
understanding. Partners will have to invest in mutual understanding, for crossing cognitive distance. 
This requires a certain intensity and duration of the relation, to build this up and recoup the 
investment involved. These conditions obtain when the need for outside complementary cognition is 
greatest, which is when there is great complexity and volatility in technology and markets. Thus the 
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perhaps by relative intensity of patent applications, there is (and should be) a ‘move to the middle’: 
away from the extreme of integration by merger or acquisition, and away from the other extreme of 
arms-length, ad hoc contracting, to temporary but more or less durable and intensive alliances. 
Trust yields a fundamental ‘instrument’ for governance. Contrary to TCE (Williamson 1993) 
I claim that trust does go beyond calculative self-interest, without thereby necessarily becoming blind 
and unconditional. This was argued in a previous section. There is certainly a need for more empirical 
testing. However, in the literatures in marketing and buyer-supplier relations there has been extensive 
operationalization of the notions of competence and trust, and empirical testing of their effects, next 
to the effects of variables from TCE. Trust has indeed been found to reduce relational risk, and to act, 
to some extent, as a substitute for other instruments for governance (Dwyer et. al. 1987, Anderson and 
Weitz 1989, Anderson and Narus 1990, Achrol 1991, Moorman et. al. 1992, Morgan and Hunt 1994, 
Berger et. al. 1995, Kumar et. al. 1995, Gulati 1995, Geyskens et. al. 1996,  Nooteboom et. al. 1997, 
de Jong and Nooteboom 2001). 
An example of an empirical study is Nooteboom et. al. (1997). In their econometric model, 
the dependent variables reflected perceived relational risk, specified in two variables: size and 
probability of switching costs. The model tested effects on relational risk of specific investments 
(TCE) and trust. The test was whether trust would add anything to TCE considerations. Trust was 
specified in two variables: habituation (routinisation) and ‘institutionalisation’, which reflected joint 
norms of conduct developed in the relationship. Operationalisations of the central variables are 
specified in Appendix A. Control variables were: contracts, mutual value, uncertainty avoidance, firm 
sizes. The hypothesis that variables of dependence and trust could be operationalised and measured 
and that trust would have an effect in addition to TCE variables was confirmed.     
 
Contingencies of governance 
For specification of econometric models in empirical work, one should take care of contingencies that 
affect causalities, and incorporate them as control variables. The choice and effectiveness of 
instruments for governance depend on conditions: the goals of collaboration, characteristics of the 
participants, technology, markets and the institutional environment. For example, there is no sense in 
contracts when the appropriate institutions of laws are not in place, the police or judiciary is corrupt, 
and when compliance cannot be monitored. When technology is flexible, so that one can produce a 
range of different specific products with one set-up, the specificity of investments and hence the 
problem of hold-up is limited. Possibilities of spillover are constrained when knowledge is tacit, and 
do not matter when technology changes fast. Reputation mechanisms don’t work when there are 
ample exit opportunities for defectors. Trust is difficult in a distrustful environment, where cheating 
rather than loyalty is the norm.  
  Innovation has its special conditions. Exchange of knowledge is crucial, with corresponding 
risks of spillover. Especially in innovation the competencies and intentions of strangers are difficult to 
judge. Relevant reputation has not yet been built up. Uncertainty is large, limiting the possibility of 
specifying the contingencies of a contract. Specific investments are needed to set op mutual 
understanding. There is significant hold-up risk. Detailed contracts would limit the variety and scope 
of unpredictable actions and initiatives that innovation requires. With these problems in contracts, 
trust is more needed to limit relational risk. An additional problem with contracts is that they may 
obstruct the building of trust. This does not mean that there are no contracts, but that they cannot be 
too detailed with the purpose of controlling hold-up risk. A productive combination of instruments is 
mutual dependence complemented by trust on the basis of an emerging experience in competent and 
loyal collaboration. Trust is needed besides mutual dependence, because the latter is sensitive to 
changing conditions. Trust is more difficult under asymmetric dependence because the more 
dependent side may be overly suspicious (Klein Woolthuis, 1999). 
  In all this, go-betweens can help. One function for them is to act as an arbitrator, in trilateral 
governance, as proposed by TCE. From a competence perspective they can also help to solve the 
‘revelation problem’ and to control spillover. From the perspective of trust they can help and in the 
building and guarding of trust, and in guiding the least destructive ending of relations. Without them 
 13the building of trust may be too slow. For these additions to roles of the ‘go-between’ see Nooteboom 
(1999).   
 
Conclusions 
This article shows that it is possible to integrate governance and competence perspectives, in a unified 
theory. However, this requires a substantial revision and extension of theoretical perspective. Among 
others, this includes a theory of knowledge and learning, a social theory of exchange that includes 
trust, an addition of spillover risk to hold-up risk, and a shift of focus from the transaction to the 
relation. The integrated framework retains instruments for governance from TCE, but de-emphasizes 
contracts, especially in innovation, and adds others, such as trust and additional roles for go-betweens.  
Some of the causalities in the integrated framework are the same as those in TCE, but others 
are added. This shifts predictions. For example, in contrast with TCE the integrated framework shows 
that uncertainty can favour disintegration rather than integration. The theory yields some predictions 
that are no less sharp than in TCE. There is progress in operationalisation and testing. In particular, it 
has been shown empirically that trust works as a determinant of the extent of hold-up risk and as a 
factor in governance, thus adding even to the predictions of TCE that are empirically most successful.   
I propose that the extended framework may contribute considerably to an understanding of the 
mixed empirical results from TCE, especially in hybrid relations. Some studies that include both 
perspectives, in a comparative analysis, demonstrate the increase of explanatory power compared to 
TCE. However, more such studies are desirable. It would also be worth-while to do a new survey of 
studies that have attempted this. This should be oriented at detailed analysis of structural equations 
rather than of reduced forms, which hide which causal relations yield successful predictions and 
which don’t.      
 
APPENDIX A: VARIABLES OF DEPENDENCE AND TRUST 
 
These variables are taken from: Nooteboom et. al. (1997). They are based on 5-point Likert scales from 
disagree to agree, or vice versa; a indicates Cronbach’s alpha. The data set was 10 customer relations for 
each of 10 suppliers of electrical/electronic goods 
 
Trust variables: 
HAB: Habitualization (a=0.75) 
-  Because we have been doing business so long with this customer, all kinds of procedures have 
become self-evident 
-  Because we have been doing business for so long with this customer, we can understand each 
other well and quickly 
-  In our contacts with this customer we have never had the feeling of being misled 
INST: Institutionalization (a=0.73) 
-  In this relation, both sides are expected not to make demands that can seriously damage the 
interests of the other 
-  In this relation the strongest side is expected not to pursue its interest at all costs 
HI: Habitualization/institutionalization (a=0.77) = Habitualization + institutionalization + item: 
-  In this relation informal agreements have the same significance as formal contracts 
 
The last item is kept apart from HAB and INST because it could with equal theoretical and empirical 
justification be added to either of them; in both cases Cronbach's alpha (a) increases with ten percentage 
points. The resulting variables were included in an econometric model to explain perceived relational 
risk, with two dimensions: the probability that the relation goes wrong, and the penalty involved if it 
does. These were operationalized as follows: 
 
Variables for relational risk: 
SLE: Size of loss ego (a=0.90) 
-  Actually, we cannot afford a break with this customer 
-  If the relation with this customer breaks, it will take us much effort to fill the gap in turnover 
 14PLE: Probability of loss ego 
-  The risk in this relation is sufficiently covered by contractual and non-contractual means 
 
The trust variables competed for explanation of relational risk with TCE variables and control variables 
on specific investments, contracts, quality dependence, revenues as percentage of total sales, uncertainty 
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Figure 2: structural equations of TCE 
 
 Specific  investments   causal relation A 
            Hold-up risk         need for   
  Uncertainty               governance       causal relation B 
         f o r m   o f   g o v e r n a n c e  
          
                    frequency 
                    of transactions   
 
 




     hold-up  risk 
uncertainty about                          
contractual  contingencies       
     degree  of  integration 
 
         i n s t r u m e n t s   o f   g o v e r n a n c e  
 
uncertainty due to innovation    need for external partners   
competence development               ,  
 
     spillover  risk   
 
 
contingencies of technology, knowledge and institutions     
 
instruments of governance: 
integration by MA 
alliances, with instruments: 
contracts (of limited value especially in innovation) 
bilateral dependence due to bilateral specific investments 
hostages (related to spillover risk) 
reputation 







    
 21Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research
 in Management 
 




Trust and Formal Control in Interorganizational Relationships 
Rosalinde Klein Woolthuis, Bas Hillebrand & Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2002-13-ORG 
 
Entrepreneurship in China: institutions, organisational idendity and survival. Empirical results from two provinces. 
Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2002-14-ORG 
 
Managing Interactions between Technological and Stylistic Innovation in the Media Industries. 
Insights from the Introduction of eBook Technology in the Publishing Industry 
Tanja S. Schweizer 
ERS-2002-16-ORG 
 
Investment Appraisal Process in the Banking & Finance Industry 
Mehari Mekonnen Akalu & Rodney Turner 
ERS-2002-17-ORG 
 








ISO 9000 series certification over time: What have we learnt? 
Ton van der Wiele & Alan Brown 
ERS-2002-30-ORG 
 





Employee Perception on Commitment Oriented Work Systems: Effects onTrust and Perceived Job Security 
Paul Boselie, Martijn Hesselink, Jaap Paauwe & Ton van der Wiele 
ERS-2001-02-ORG 
 
The Emergence of a Private Business Sector in China: The Case of Zhejiang 
Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2001-03-ORG 
 
                                                           
 A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
http://www.ers.erim.eur.nl 
 
 ERIM  Research  Programs: 
  LIS  Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
  ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT  Marketing   
  F&A  Finance and Accounting 
  STR  Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
   
 
Contingent Employment in the Netherlands 
Ferrie Pot, Bas Koene & Jaap Paauwe 
ERS-2001-04-ORG 
 




The Dutch Banking Chipcard Game: Understanding a Battle between Two Standards 
Henk J. de Vries & George W.J. Hendrikse 
ERS-2001-18-ORG 
 
Social Structures for Learning 
Irma Bogenrieder & Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2001-23-ORG 
 
Empirical Evidence for the relation between customer satisfaction and business performance? 
Ton van der Wiele, Paul Boselie & Martijn Hesselink 
ERS-2001-32-ORG 
 
On the emergence of growers’ associations: self-selection versus market power 
G.W.J. Hendrikse & W.J.J. Bijman 
ERS-2001-34-ORG 
 
Employee perceptions of HRM and TQM and the effects on satisfaction and intention to leave 
Paul Boselie & Ton van der Wiele 
ERS-2001-42-ORG 
 
Project Contract Management and a Theory of Organization 
J. Rodney Turner & Stephen J. Simister 
ERS-2001-43-ORG 
 
The Geography of International Strategy: A multi-level framework 
Douglas van den Berghe 
ERS-2001-51-ORG 
 
“The E-Business Research Network”. Summary of the results of the Dutch pilot survey 
Ton van der Wiele, Roger Williams, Jos van Iwaarden, Melanie Wilson & Barrie Dale 
ERS-2001-59-ORG 
 
Cold Wars and Hot Issues. (Management of Responsibilities) 
Dr Slawomir Magala 
ERS-2001-64-ORG 
 
Macro Intentions, Micro Realities: A two-level strategic approach to the single European market 
Alan Muller & Rob van Tulder 
ERS-2001-70-ORG 
 










The Causality of Supply Relationships: a Comparison between the US, Japan and Europe 
Gjalt de Jong & Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2001-73-ORG 
 




The practice of investment appraisal: An empirical enquiry? 
Mehari Mekonnen Akala & Rodney Turner 
ERS-2001-77-ORG 
 
Investment Appraisal Process: A Case of Chemical Companies 
Mehari Mekonnen Akala & Rodney Turner 
ERS-2001-78-ORG 
 
China Incorporated: Property Rights, Privatisation, and the Emergence of a Private Business Sector in China 
Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2001-81-ORG 
 




The Economics of corruption and cronyism – an institutional approach 
Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2001-83-ORG 
 
Combining Commerce and Culture: Establishing Business Relations in China 
Barbara Krug & Frank Belschak 
ERS-2001-84-ORG 
 
Entrepreneurship by Alliance 









Marketing Cooperatives and Financial Structure: a Transaction Costs Economics Analysis 
George W.J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman 
ERS-2000-09-ORG 
 
A Marketing Co-operative as a System of Attributes: A case study of VTN/The Greenery International BV, 
Jos Bijman, George Hendrikse & Cees Veerman 
ERS-2000-10-ORG 
 
Marketing Co-operatives: An Incomplete Contracting Perspective 
George W.J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman 
ERS-2000-13– ORG 
 
Ownership Structure in Agrifood Chains: The Marketing Cooperative 
George W.J. Hendrikse & W.J.J. (Jos) Bijman 
ERS-2000-15-ORG 
 
 iiiOrganizational Change and Vested Interests 
George W.J. Hendrikse 
ERS-2000-17-ORG 
 




Foundations of a Theory of Social Forms 
László Pólos, Michael T. Hannan & Glenn R. Carroll 
ERS-2000-29-ORG 
 
Reasoning with partial Knowledge 
László Pólos & Michael T. Hannan 
ERS-2000-30-ORG 
 
The Strawberry Growth Underneath the Nettle: The Emergence of Entrepreneurs in China 
Barbara Krug & Lászlo Pólós 
ERS-2000-34-ORG 
 












Human Resource Management and Performance: Lessons from the Netherlands 
Paul Boselie, Jaap Paauwe & Paul Jansen 
ERS-2000-46-ORG 
 
Possible futures for the HR function in different market 
Roger Williams, Jaap Paauwe & Anne Keegan 
ERS-2000-54-ORG 
 
Quantity versus Quality in Project Based Learning Practices 
Anne Keegan & J. Rodney Turner 
ERS-2000-55-ORG 
 
The Management of Innovation in Project Based Firms 
Anne Keegan and J. Rodney Turner 
ERS-2000-57-ORG 
 
Learning by Experience in the Project-Based Organization 
J. Rodney Turner, Anne Keegan & Lynn Crawford 
ERS-2000-58-ORG 
 
 iv